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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

PEACE OPERATIONS: THE LEAST UNDERSTOOD MISSION-A CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM

BY

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ABSTRACT

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It is somewhat paradoxical that as the only remaining superpower in the world, the US military has found itself busier than ever. With the implementation of a national security policy of engagement and enlargement there has been a corresponding and unprecedented proliferation of the use of the US military for operations other than war. These operations are inherently ambiguous and complex. They are, in fact, the least understood mission for the military for the new millennium. The purpose of this paper, is twofold. First, to review the impetus of the military's proliferated use of these missions - our current national security policy on peace operations. Second, to critically analyze the complexities and challenges associated with the military's ability to support peace operations by (1) defining the various types of peace operations the military may find itself involved, (2) identifying the unique principles associated with mission success, and (3) addressing the unique training requirements needed for successful execution of these complex missions.

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PEACE OPERATIONS, THE LEAST UNDERSTOOD MISSIONA CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM

"Given the experience of crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, there is considerable debate over when, how, or whether the United States should undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions..... Nor is there a consensus on the stake Americans have in those conflicts and the price they should bear in resolving them."

Les Aspin¹

As suggested above by the then Secretary of Defense, a very real uncertainty surrounds the ongoing debate over methods to resolve the growing number of internal conflicts that plague our world. Today more than ever the United States military finds itself right in the middle of this debate. Why? The answer rest in an analysis of the evolution of the geostrategic environment over the last few years.

The world has transitioned from two competing superpowers into a new environment of increasing instability among third world countries. International security once held in check by superpower rivalry is now challenged by international politics and multi-national relations. As the world's sole superpower, the United States has been thrust into the forefront in maintaining world order. Since the United States is the only country with the resources necessary to project power throughout the world, the United Nations and regional organizations consistently look to us for support. Our most viable means of

influence are our instruments of national power. Of these, military power has increasingly become the instrument of choice. Therefore, the United States military finds itself in the middle of an uncomfortable debate over its proper use in a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment.

The impact has been significant to say the least. It is somewhat paradoxical that as the only remaining superpower in the world, the United States military has found itself busier than ever. To some degree this is a result of there being nearly 40 percent fewer people in the military work force, but to a greater degree it is a function of a national security policy of engagement and enlargement in a still unsettled international environment.

This paper will not question the viability of our National Security Strategy and its primary tenets of shape, respond, and prepare. However, with the implementation of this policy there has been a corresponding and unprecedented proliferation of the use of the United States military for operations other than war, specifically, peace operations. These operations are inherently ambiguous and complex. They are, in fact, the least understood mission for the military for the new millennium. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is twofold. First, to review the impetus of the military's proliferated use for these missions – our current national security policy on peace operations. Second,

to critically analyze the complexities and challenges associated with the military's ability to support peace operations by (1) defining the various types of peace operations the military may find itself involved, (2) identifying the unique principles associated with mission success, and (3) addressing the unique training requirements needed for successful execution of these complex missions.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY - THE CHALLENGE

"The United States must have the tools necessary to carry out the National Security Strategy. We have worked diligently within the parameters of the balanced Budget Agreement to preserve and provide for the readiness of our armed forces while meeting priority military challenges identified in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)."

William J. Clinton³

Support of the President's National Security Strategy is the preeminent role of the military. However, with a shrinking budget, a smaller force structure, and an increased propensity to use the military for nontraditional missions like peace operations, this task has become increasingly difficult.

The first real indication that there was a significant challenge to the military's ability to professionally execute large, complex peace operations while simultaneously maintaining the capability to fight two Major Theater Wars (MTW) was our dubious experience in Somalia. As a result of this operation, the President implemented Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)

- 25. It remains the most clearly articulated policy from the Administration on United States participation in peace operations. This document, in addition to identifying several major reform issues, makes a major effort in defining our nation's role in peace operations. Specifically, it identifies the criteria with which United States participation is weighed against:
 - 1. Participation advances United States interests and risks to American personnel are acceptable.
 - 2. Personnel, funds and other resources are available.
 - 3. United States participation is necessary for the operation's success.
 - 4. Clear objectives exist and an endpoint for United States involvement is identified.
 - 5. Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshaled.
 - 6. Command and control relationships are acceptable, considering United States involvement.
 - 7. Sufficient force will be committed to achieve clearly defined objectives.
 - 8. A plan exists to decisively achieve those objectives.
 - 9. A commitment exists to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition, of our forces to achieve our objectives.

Ostensibly, one would conclude that with the implementation of this directive the administration has learned that it is critical to thoroughly analyze and evaluate our participation in these operations in pursuit of national security objectives.

However, even with the application of these criteria the United States military has experienced a 300 percent increase in operational tempo (OPTEMPO) over the last several years - almost entirely a result of peace operations.⁵

Another, more recent indication that a serious challenge exists with regards to the military's ability to continue participation in peace operations at the current pace and tempo can be seen though a careful analysis of the President's two most resent national security strategy documents. Although neither document specifically addresses peace operations in depth, they do discuss them in context of a broader discussion on the need for the United States military to conduct smaller-scale contingency operations.

The President's 1997 national security strategy, <u>A National</u> Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997, states:

All United States forces will remain multimission capable and will be trained and managed with multiple missions in mind. At times it will be in our national interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain and restore peace. American participation in peace operations takes many forms, such as the NATO coalition in Bosnia, the American-led United Nations force in Haiti and our involvement in the multilateral coalition in the Sinai.

Finally, our military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement - from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies.

The President's 1998 national security strategy, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, October 1998, states:

"Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of war, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations,

enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and intervention. These operations will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U. S. forces cumulatively require significant commitments These operations will also put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other U.S. Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners. only must the U.S. military be prepared multiple successfully conduct smaller-scale contingencies worldwide, it must be prepared to do so in face of challenges such as terrorism, information operations and the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces must also remain prepared to withdraw form contingency operations if needed to deploy to a major theater war. Accordingly, appropriate U.S. forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will be trained, equipped and organized to be multi-mission capable."

Notice the subtle change from the 1997 policy to the 1998 policy

- all forces must be multi-mission capable changed to
appropriate forces will be multi-mission capable. There is
obviously a realization by our national leaders that all forces
can not maintain a multi-mission capability. Although, to date
we (the military) have not clearly identified which forces are
appropriate to maintain multi-mission capability. We have rapid
deployment forces; however, they do not train for peace
operations. This issue will be addressed later.
Realistically, this subtle policy change does little to lessen
the challenge for the military for several reasons. First,
since the military is the most responsive, most readily employed

and the most visible element that our national leaders can bring to bear on any problem, it appears obvious that it will continue to be used at an ever increasing rate. In support of this premise our current National Defense Strategy states:

In order to support the national security strategy, the United States military and the Department of Defense must be able to help shape the international security environment in ways favorable to United States interests, respond to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. These three elements — shaping, responding, and preparing — define the essence of United States defense strategy between now and 2015.8

Second, our National Defense Strategy still mandates that virtually every unit be able to execute the full spectrum of military operations from conducting multiple smaller-scale contingency operations to fighting and winning major theater wars and be able to transition between the two almost instantaneously. Specifically it states that:

"...the United States military must be prepared to conduct successfully multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations worldwide... Importantly, United States forces must also be able to withdraw from smaller-scale contingency operations, reconstitute, and then deploy to a major theater war in accordance with required timelines. Although in some cases this may post significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges, the ability to transition between peacetime operations and war fighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every unit in

the United States military. United States forces must be multi-mission capable and they must be organized, trained, equipped, and managed with multiple missions in mind."9

This policy so narrowly focuses the requirement to "virtually every unit" that it more closely reflects the 1997 National Security Strategy rather than the newly published one. In other words, DOD may be creating a training dilemma within the military.

THE MOST COMPLEX AND LEAST UNDERSTOOD MISSION

"United States forces may be directed to participate in complex peace operations or other operations which stand in a gray zone between peace and war"

General Shalikashvili¹⁰

Adding to the challenge of the military's ability to support the national security strategy across the entire spectrum of military operations is the ambiguity and inherent complexity of peace operations. For instance, it is not universally understood throughout the military establishment that the United States, as a member nation of the United Nations conducts peace operations under the provisions of Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. However, the United States does reserve the right to conduct operations unilaterally in conformance with appropriate international law. Normally, "peacekeeping" operations, which involve high levels of consent and strict impartiality, are operations authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI which specifically discusses the

peaceful settlement of disputes. On the other hand, "Peace enforcement" operations, which involve a low level of consent and questionable impartiality, are conducted under mandates governed by Chapter VII. 11

Adding to the misunderstanding, all operations which involve efforts to intercede in order to prevent or diminish conflicts are often lumped together and called either "peacekeeping" or "peace operations." Therefore, the terms themselves have become ambiguous and inaccurate in describing the actual missions. This, in and of itself, adds to the tremendous complexity of peace operations - there is currently no agreement on defining the terms used to identify and discuss the entire range of activities involved in these unique operations. As a result there is often confusion.

Interestingly, the "lack of [a] clear definition provides a measure of flexibility that serves political and operational purposes," a loophole that gives great latitude in applying the term. 12 This fact has not been overlooked by some states that have used peacekeeping terms and inference in an attempt to legitimize, or give a flavor of international acceptance to intervention operations.

One example of stretching the concept of peacekeeping for political purposes is our invasion of Grenada, "Urgent Fury."

This operation was conducted in conjunction with the

multinational "Caribbean Peacekeeping Force," which arrived on the island prepared to fight (something peacekeeping forces are not supposed to do), ahead of the 82nd Airborne. 13 The United States State Department described Urgent Fury as collective action by "the Combined United States-Caribbean Peace Force...to protect lives and restore order. 14 However, one analyst says the operation "...was really a smokescreen to conceal the real motive: the seizing of an unprecedented opportunity to rid the Caribbean of an expanding Communist threat..." Another analyst describes the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force as an "arrangement...that was designed as a rather flimsy fig-leaf which failed to add much respectability to what was after all generally recognized to be an intervention operation." 16

This example is cited <u>not</u> to infer that Urgent Fury was unnecessary, unjustified, or in some way illegal, but rather to illustrate the confusion that results when ambiguous peace operations are used to politically color the intent of a military operation that is not peacekeeping.

Obviously, the use of the generic terms "peacekeeping" or "peace operations" to describe activities conducted by the United States and others is insufficient and deserves further clarification. Below are the recommended acceptable definitions (an amalgamation from JP 3-07 and FM 100-23), which must be universally understood and agreed upon.

Peace Operations is an umbrella term used to describe all operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. They are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Peace operations must be tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. There are three categories of peace operations: those operations with a predominantly diplomatic lead (preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-building) and two complementary, predominantly military operations (peacekeeping and peace-enforcement).

Preventive Diplomacy consist of diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis and aimed at removing the sources of conflict before violence erupts or to limit the spread of violence when it occurs. Military support to diplomacy may, for example, take the form of a preventive deployment. An example is Operation ABLE SENTRY, where United States forces deployed in 1993 to Macedonia in support of the United Nations effort to limit the fighting in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.

Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges ends to disputes and resolves issues that led to conflict.

Military activities that support peacemaking include militaryto-military relations and security assistance.

Peace-building consists of post-conflict actions,

predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and

rebuild civil infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid

a relapse into conflict. Military support to peace-building may

include, for example, rebuilding roads, reestablishing or

creating government entities, or the training of defense forces.

Peacekeeping operations are military or paramilitary operations that are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents; designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (existing truce, cease fire, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach long-term political settlement. An example of a Peacekeeping operation is the United States commitment to the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) in the Sinai since 1982.

Peace-enforcement operations are the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peace-enforcement operations include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an

environment for truce or cease fire. Unlike peacekeeping operations, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of peace-enforcing operations are Operation Power Pack conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993.¹⁷

Another way of understanding peace operations is that if they were all placed on a continuum with small, low intensity operations at one end and larger, high intensity operations at the other, preventive diplomacy would be placed towards the lower end and peace enforcement would be at the high intensity end of the continuum. There is a wide area along the continuum between preventive diplomacy and peace enforcement. It is imperative that all parties involved, especially the soldiers expected to execute them, have a clear and unambiguous understanding of these operations. Failure to do so could quickly lead to incidents and misunderstandings that could reduce the United States legitimacy and result in actions that are inconsistent with the overall political objectives.

Once the various types of peace operations are uniformly understood we must address other challenges which add to the complexity for the military. First and most importantly, we must realize that these missions require different skills.

Peace operations are extremely complex and unfamiliar to most

military units because they routinely train solely for combat. This complexity results from:

(1) the nature of the military operation itself, (2) the significant roles played by non-DOD departments and agencies, (3) the significant participation (and sometimes leadership) of non United States Government entities, and (4) the dominant role of the Department of State in establishing military objectives as well as orchestrating all of the mechanisms of conflict resolution. 18

As previously stated, these complex issues require special skills and disciplines normally not associated with units trained, equipped, and organized for combat. The specialized training requirements for peace operations will be addressed later.

PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND PEACE OPERATIONS

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center (CMOC) to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or firesupport operations center."

LtGen A.C. Zinni, USMC, CG, I MEF19

One of the unique demands placed on leaders trained in the art of war asked to execute peace operations is that the familiar applications of the principles of war are no longer valid. Instead they are forced to operate under a new, unfamiliar set of principles. For while peace operations may involve the use of force, they are not technically war fighting operations. As a consequence, both of their different purposes

and of the different environments in which they take place, peace operations force leaders to violate the standard principles of war, which both increases the short-term military risk to the solders and makes their leaders very uncomfortable. 20 An entire new set of "rules" which lead to successful accomplishment of the military mission must be learned.

With this in mind, the operative question becomes; "What principles apply to peace operations?" Joint Publication 3-0 and Joint Publication 3-07 briefly address this issue but only in the larger context of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations," delineates six MOOTW principles: objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.²¹

Joint Publication 3-07, "Joint Doctrine for Military

Operation Other Than War," states: "Political considerations

and the nature of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)

require an underpinning of additional principles different than
those of the principles of war."²²

However, neither publication specifically addresses the principles inherently unique to successful execution of peace operations. David Alberts and Richard Hayes do in their book "Command Arrangements for Peace Operations." A brief discussion of their points on this subject follows.

The first principle of war that must be abandoned by the military involved in peace operations is **Surprise**. Given that peace operations are intended to build trust and verify the continuation of an agreed set of physical conditions (a demilitarized zone, separation of forces, etc.), the military must be visible and prevent creating uncertainty on the "battlefield." Their physical security, as well as the stability of the peace arrangements, depends on the absence of surprises. As uncomfortable as the scene of United States

Marines landing at night on a Somali beach under television lights made us feel, it was a correct peace operation event, albeit more dramatic then necessary. The point is that the possibility of an accidental encounter with some party to the conflict there was minimized by advanced notice.²³

As soon as Surprise is abandoned, Security is compromised — a situation deplored by military leaders trained for combat.

Certainly, a prudent degree of force protection must be taken.

But the fact is that soldiers involved in peace operations often must accept greater risk than warfighting troops for they must expose themselves to the "enemy" to succeed. One of the interesting issues the we have faced in peace operations is that the traditional peacekeeping countries, such as the Scandinavians, believe that our military forces are poorly suited for this type of duty because they are unwilling to take

this risk. For example, when our forces were first sent to Macedonia to join the United Nations peace observers there, the local United Nations commander noted that he could not trust the United States troops because they were so reluctant to expose themselves to parties, an essential part of success as peacekeepers. Field operations by our deployed forces were delayed while local training and situation familiarizations were accomplished in country!²⁴

No principle of war is more violated in peace operations than the Offensive. Peace operations are inherently reactive and passive. Even when one of the parties appears to be preparing to violate a peace agreement, soldiers acting as peace operators are usually constrained to simply warning the parties and threatening action if a violation occurs. In some cases, where the perceived costs of renewed violence are more than the risks assessed, military forces might be moved into positions that make the violation more difficult, more visible, or more dangerous for the violator. However, even these types of actions may be seen as provocative and destroy the trust of some parties. Often, in simple peacekeeping operations, the United Nations has traditionally threatened withdrawal as its most aggressive proactive action²⁵ - an action uncomfortable to the United States military.

Concentration is usually a "last-resort tactic for peace operators and is often seen as provocative. Given that the military personnel involved in the peace operation do not want to become party to the conflict, they must avoid creating threats to the belligerent parties. Moreover, assembly of major forces draws the attention of the parties and may cause them to concentrate their own forces, thereby creating a more dangerous situation. If anything, peace forces want to remain dispersed and ubiquitous in the areas they are responsible for monitoring."²⁶

The principles of war that ought to ideally be preserved in peace operations are Unity of Command, Objective, and Simplicity. However, even these are very difficult to achieve in any coalition operation and have proven extremely difficult in coalition peace operations.²⁷

First, true Unity of Command in a multinational force is virtually impossible. Neither the United States nor any other power is likely to allow their forces to join a multinational peace operation and cut their ties to the national command structure and political agenda. The experience in Somalia, where national groups maintained dual chains of command and multiple agendas predominated, is mirrored by the independence of French behavior in Rwanda and the need for separate command arrangements for Arab forces in the Desert Storm coalition.

What is needed is a conscious effort to achieve "Unity of Purpose" in peace operations. 28 Even this is a very real challenge and depends as much or more on diplomatic relationships as on military ones. Moreover, even the military relationships must be more consultative than directive-driven.

The principle of the **Objective** is obviously influenced heavily by the lack of Unity of Command. However, the importance of clearly articulated objectives is magnified in multinational forces. Given the absence of common doctrine or language, both detailed review of specific military objectives and the exchange of liaison officers to ensure on-going dialogue and communication become essential for success.²⁹

Simplicity also becomes a watchword in coalition operations, but is inherently much more difficult to achieve. Not only are the forces involved often very different in the level of sophistication of their weapons, training, and communications equipment; they are also often unfamiliar with one another. In many cases they have serious communications problems - linguistic and technical. Attempts at complex operations are, therefore, fraught with peril. Commanders must rely on a combination of tools, such as assigning geographic and functional responsibilities to forces that have a history of working together effectively and using mission assignments that do not ask too much of forces with limited professionalism.

These assignments must also be made in ways that are politically sensitive, so that home governments are receptive and the elements of the peace force perceive that they have appropriate roles. Making simple plans under these trying circumstances requires sophisticated and complex decision making and coordination.³⁰

To add to the complexity, forces with missions such as peace enforcement may well be conducting classic military operations. They will be relying on traditional principles of war except where that reliance makes it more difficult to achieve their overall mission. Such forces may well need to concentrate superior forces, rely on surprise, take measures to ensure the security of their forces, and seize the military initiative. However, the goals of their operations will typically be limited and their offensive operations designed to establish the credibility of their forces and induce the parties to make greater efforts to find political solutions. They are unlikely to include the destruction of major forces or the creation of dangerous situations in which military force will be continually required to ensure the peace.³¹

The realistic principles for peace operations, which must be universally understood and applies during planning and execution, might best be stated as Unity of Purpose (Effort);

Consensus Planning; Simplicity; Adaptive Control; and Transparency of Operations.

The first three of these principles are closely interrelated. Unity of Purpose is created and maintained by adopting Consensus Planning. This permits the interaction necessary to "hear" the different national agendas relevant to the operation and to build confidence within the coalition. At the same time, Simplicity is essential both to ensure that consensus can be built and to make it easy to maintain the clear objectives and procedures on which effective Unity of Purpose depends. The lack of mutual doctrine, linguistic barriers (both cultural and professional), and differential levels of capability and training within a multinational force make complex plans into recipes for defeat. Where sophisticated military operations are required, they need to be stated as simple functional elements of the plan and left to specific national forces with the requisite capabilities. In many cases these burdens will fall on United States forces. 32

In the context of coalition peace operations, however, simplicity's connotation shifts to both keeping the set of military plans simple and appropriate for the forces assigned and ensuring that directives are clear and perceived correctly by all the elements of the peacekeeping force and the other

agencies and organizations who are supporting the peace effort or whose activities will be impacted by them. In this sense, "simplicity" requires enormous effort and is also related to transparency.³³

The last two principles are derived primarily from the nature of peace operations and the environments in which they are undertaken. The need for Adaptive Control is driven by the essentially passive and reactive nature of peace operations. refers to understanding the situation well enough to specify the range of possible courses of action that can evolve, collecting and assimilating the information necessary to recognize which of those courses of actions is emerging, and taking timely action to influence the course of events such that the mission or objective is achieved. Unlike traditional military operation, peace operations must be reactive, therefore, the only intelligent level of control to seek is adaptive, and the preparation of contingency plans to control major developments allows the maximum "pre-real time" planning. This also helps to keep plans simple and to allow consensus planning rather than reactive, ad hoc planning in a time-stressed environment.34

Transparency of Operations is primarily desirable so that the parties to the conflict are not surprised by military actions and are given minimal opportunity to misunderstand them. For example, regular patrolling designed to minimize the

opportunity for mischief is preferable to irregular patrolling designed to catch violators red-handed. Announced convoys of supplies and prearranged evacuations allow the military to accomplish important objectives without creating uncertainty about their cargoes, purposes, or movements. Transparent operations are also easier to keep simple and generate consensus about. Hence, they are most likely to preserve Unity of Purpose in the coalition.³⁵

TRAINING

A well-trained and disciplined military unit is the foundation upon which to build a peacekeeping force."

LTG T. Montgomery, USA, Senior MILREP NATO³⁶

There has been a significant shift in the National Defense Strategy of just three short years ago when the primary mission of our Armed Forces was articulated as: "...not peace operations; it is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our most important interests are threatened." 37

Such a significant shift in policy, whether justified or not, requires major changes in the way the military trains and organizes. In essence we (the military) have promulgated a major change in policy without implementing the requisite corresponding changes in military force structure, doctrine, and training. In other words, serious consideration of changes to address the issues inherent to the new policy we have

implemented is slow to develop. Specifically, the issues of the requisite special training requirements associated with peace operations, the consequential decrease in combat readiness among those units participating in peace operations, and a realistic analysis and risk assessment associated with the training required to "transition" them from employment in peace operations to employment at the other end of the continuum - a major theater war. In short, a national defense strategy based on "multi-mission capable" forces is an admirable concept but it is extremely difficult to execute. Our military is the best in the world but to ask units to be organized, trained, and equipped to execute, to a publicly expected standard of excellence, multiple missions spanning the entire spectrum of military operations with limited resources is unrealistic. continuum between peace operations and MTW is huge and continues to grow!

The Army has tried to address some of these issues by publishing Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations. Ironically, however, no unit in the Army has peace operations on its Mission Essential Tasks List (METL) - those tasks they are required to maintain at a high degree of training proficiency. The reason for this is that our training doctrine mandates that a unit's METL tasks will contain only those tasks it's most likely to execute during war. Therefore, the Army's manual on one of its

most likely missions seldom gets the attention it deserves until a unit is called upon to execute a peace operation. Then "predeployment training" is conducted to prepare it for employment in the unfamiliar and extremely complex environment of a peace operation.

Units selected for these duties require time to train and prepare for a significant amount of tasks that may be different from their wartime tasks. Individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change their focus from wartime to the unique demands placed on soldiers in peace operations.³⁸

This practice of identifying a unit to deploy for peace operations, reorganizing it to fit the specific mission (this is usually an amalgamation of personnel from several different units not use to working together), training it for an nontraditional, volatile, mission, deploying it, conducting the mission, re-deploying it, then executing months of post-deployment training in order to get it back to a satisfactory level of combat readiness is problematic, inefficient, and has a significant negative impact on overall combat readiness.

What is needed to address this problem and still support the national security strategy is the identification of appropriate units for rapid deployment for peace operations.

These units would not abdicate their responsibilities for wartime missions, simply reduce them to a manageable number so peace operation tasks could be added to their METL. Unit

training plans could then be developed to address the specific peace operations tasks utilizing FM 25-100 procedures. These tasks would then be trained to the standards articulated in a supplemental Mission Training Plan (MTP) to be published. This MTP would include recommended Command Post Exercises (CPXs), Situational Training Exercises (STXs), Field Training Exercises (FTXs), and an Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) to evaluate mission readiness. Units most likely to deploy for peace operations would then have a focused training program, which covers their most likely missions. They could even incorporate rotations through the Joint Training Readiness Center (JRTC) with peace operations specific scenarios.

Additionally, and extremely important, these rapidly deployable units could develop special, habitual, and familiar working relationships with other key players in the peace operation arena. Players who contribute significantly to the success of peace operations but, unfortunately, also to their complexity. These include but are not limited to the Non-Department of Defense government agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO), International Organizations (IO), coalition and regional partners.

In accordance with appropriate Army training doctrine, individual training should also be addressed. Soldiers Manuals

should be developed which specifically outline individual peace operation tasks at the appropriate skill levels. This is extremely important since peace operations are usually done on a decentralized basis by three- or four-man teams requiring even skill level one soldiers to be proficient in basic peacekeeping tasks - especially as these tasks are often performed in the light of the news media.

There is also a need for greater instruction on peace operations within the officer and NCO education systems. Currently, there is little emphasis on this specialized subject in professional development courses. As previously stated peace operations call for decentralized mission execution. dispersion requires greater political-military sophistication in younger officers, to include direct contact with the media, nongovernmental organizations, and foreign governments, as well as coping with the inherent ambiguities and complexities of such international operations. 39 Accordingly, appropriate coverage of peace operations should be integrated into the curriculums of the senior service colleges, the Command and Staff Colleges, the officer advanced and basic courses, and the NCO Education System. Specific content and instruction methodology for peace operations in these courses would have to be determined, but as a minimum should encompass the basics of the spectrum of peace operations from observation to enforcement. The essential point is that our military education systems should strive to impart a fuller understanding to one of the most likely missions our leaders are apt to encounter.

Finally, a functional course for key unit leaders and staff officers would be desirable. This joint course should be developed by TRADOC and taught by a proponent to be identified (probably either the Infantry School or the Military Police School). The course would be based on our most likely missions and would take into account the latest Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and lessons learned from the field. In addition, certain subjects and the long experience reflected in the Nordic training programs (Appendix A, given as an example) should be incorporated as appropriate.

This combination of collective, individual, and leader training for peace operations would impart the needed degree of expertise in those soldiers and leaders who will be executing these complex missions. This is not to say that they should ignore their warfighting skills. First and foremost, peacekeeper must be good soldiers imbued with the warrior spirit and the associated combat proficiencies. Peace operators must be effective warfighters. Peace missions have and will continue to put military forces into harm's way. However, they must be more than warfighters. For in addition to combat skills, soldiers and leaders in appropriately identified units must be

knowledgeable of and comfortable with the unique skills associated with peace operations. This is especially important given the expectations of success inherent in any United States military operation and the expected attention such operations invariably receive from the media. In addition to giving all a better understanding of peace operations, the identification of "appropriate" units would free other forces to concentrate solely on their wartime missions and thus improve overall combat readiness.

CONCLUSION

"The will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course. There must be positive endeavors to preserve peace."

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 193740

It is unquestionable that the United States should continue to protect its national interests throughout the world.

According to our National Security and National Defense

Strategies one of the most viable ways to do this is through our participation in peace operations. The military, as an important instrument of national power, must be properly organized and prepared to assist in this endeavor. From a national perspective the use of the military for peace operations thus far has proven to be easy, effective, and efficient. According, we should expect a continued increase in

the demand for the military for these particular missions.

However, as this paper states, peace operations are extremely complex and currently unfamiliar to the majority of our military forces trained solely in the art of war. Even the definitions of the various types of peace operations are not unanimously agreed upon. Certainly the applicable principles requisite to mission success are not. This paper tried to clarify these issues.

To exacerbate the problem, the military is not properly trained to execute these missions without a significant and time-consuming pre-deployment effort. The military can ill-afford to continue to operate in this manner. Missions are unclear. Appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures are unfamiliar to those most likely to execute them. OPTEMPO is high and continues to rise, due in part for the need for significant pre- and post-deployment training. This has resulted in lower morale of the troops and a decline in combat readiness. As General (Ret) Colin Powel has stated with respect to future military operations, "peace operations are a given." This paper argues that it's time for us to recognize this and aggressively address the associated issues. Accordingly, we should identify appropriate units for peace operations, re-look our training doctrine to allow the inclusion of tasks associated

with peace operations on unit METLs, and revamp our training and education systems to incorporate peace operations.

One thing remains clear, the military can best support the President's national security strategy by providing national leaders with the appropriate rapidly responsive, relevant forces, trained and ready to accomplish the most proliferated mission of the last several years and the most likely yet least understood mission for the foreseeable future.

Word Count: 6,484

APPENDIX A: PEACEKEEPING TRAINING IN NORDIC COUNTRIES

The Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland have been regular participants in United Nations peacekeeping organizations. Since all four of these nations have small regular armies, they rely on conscripts, or exconscript, volunteers to man their UN Stand-by Forces. While training in soldier skills and in basic UN (peacekeeping) service is done separately by each country, economies of scale are realized by combined training for some UN service (this was initiated in 1968). This has resulted in the establishment of UN regional training centers that have some specialization by nation. These peacekeeping functional courses are offered as required (some of this information is based on the Peacekeeper's Handbook, which is dated):

- UN Observer's Course (3 weeks). This is offered at different times by both Finland and Sweden to prepare selected Nordic officers for duty as UN Military Observers (UNMOs). The course focuses on the duties and required skills of UNMOs within a specific mission area, reviews the history of UN peace producing efforts, stresses the unique dynamics of peacekeeping, and reviews UN specific procedures. This course also stresses "military English."
- UN Staff Officers Course (3 weeks). This course is taught for Nordic officers in Sweden and is intended to prepare students for staff officer functions either as part of the force headquarters or as part of a contingent staff. This course is divided into five areas: general orientation, staff duties, military English, communications, and miscellaneous.

- Military Police Course (2 ½ weeks). This course is taught in Denmark to train MPs for the Nordic countries, especially for UN duty. Soldiers are taught police skills and investigative techniques as part of a peacekeeping force. Specific subject areas include: peacekeeping orientation, MP service, MP administration, communications, military English, and case studies.
- UN Movement Control Course (2 ½ weeks). This instruction in Norway is to train Nordic personnel on UN land, sea, and air movement control procedures—especially for peacekeeping operation.
- UN Logistics Staff Course (2 weeks). This course is taught in Norway to prepare officers to function as logistics specialists in UN peacekeeping operations and in international disaster relief missions.

As a whole, these course taught over a period of 25 years demonstrate the utility of specialized training in order to conduct peacekeeping operations in a professional manner. Admittedly, some of the training is a refresher in basic military skills like map reading and first aide for former conscripts, but the core content focuses on the unique requirements of functioning in a peacekeeping environment within a UN framework.

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